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Lang, John T.. |
The Commission's Guidance paper on exclusionary abuse under Article 82 EC is open to three fundamental criticisms. First, it leads to less legal certainty, because the rules suggested are vague and imprecise, because dominant companies will not have the information needed to apply them, and because the Commission is trying to change the law, which it has no power to do. Second, it would lead to some anticompetitive effects, because in practice it discourages price competition, by discouraging individualised price negotiations and retroactive rebates, and by suggesting that the Commission will protect not-yet-as-efficient competitors from price competition. Third, it leads to too many "false positives", i.e., findings of exclusionary abuse that are not... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Article 82EC; Competition; Abuse; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; K21. |
Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54282 |
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Rejesus, Roderick M.; Little, Bertis B.; Lovell, Ashley C.; Cross, Mike H.; Shucking, Michael. |
This article analyzes anomalous patterns of agent, adjuster, and producer claim outcomes and determines the most likely pattern of collusion that is suggestive of fraud, waste, and abuse in the federal crop insurance program. Log-linear analysis of Poisson-distributed counts of anomalous entities is used to examine potential patterns of collusion. The most likely pattern of collusion present in the crop insurance program is where agents, adjusters, and producers nonrecursively interact with each other to coordinate their behavior. However, if a priori an intermediary is known to initiate and coordinate the collusion, a pattern where the producer acts as the intermediary is the most likely pattern of collusion evidenced in the data. These results have... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Abuse; Collusion; Crop insurance; Empirical analysis; Fraud; Waste; G22; Q12; Q18; Q19. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43393 |
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